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How The Narrative About
Louisiana's Non-Unanimous
Criminal Jury System Became a
Person of Interest in the Case
Against Justice in the Deep South

by Angela A. Allen-Bell*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Stories are central to what lawyers do; yet, to the average member of
the legal community, they exist only inconspicuously. In actuality, all
cases start with a story. As lawyers do their work, that initial story
* Associate Professor of Legal Writing & Analysis, Southern University Law Center.
Northwestern State University (B.A., 1992); Southern University Law Center (J.D., 1998).
Member, State Bar of Louisiana.
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obvious commitment of many individuals whose concern for a meaningful event was
evident from inception to completion of the Symposium.
Beyond this, I owe an
immeasurable debt of gratitude to my research assistant, Candace Newell, who, despite the
demands of her last year of law school, willingly indulged me in depleting philosophical
discussions of this topic and who responded graciously to my numerous requests for
sources, many of which required travel, calls, digging, and many long hours of reading.
Without her support, skills, and dedication, this work would not have taken form as it did.
I also salute Christine Wells, who willingly answered the call to provide pro bono, law
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who graciously reviewed this work. Lastly, I thank the Bell family, Julian Johnson, and
Kacy Collins-Thomas for generally supporting this project, for entertaining questions,
performing editorial functions, and sharing feedback.
With much gratitude, the Author acknowledges and thanks Southern University Law
Center for funding this project through the award of a summer 2015 writing stipend. For
permission to reprint the article, please contact Angela A. Allen-Bell at: ABell@sulc.edu.
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grows and evolves. When judges enter the picture, the story is revised
and, ultimately, the final chapter is written; then, the process begins
again with an entirely different cast of characters.
This Article
advocates against impersonal, mechanized systems of justice that are
built upon defendants, dockets, cases, quotas, formulas, and rapidity.
This Article calls for the justice community to see cases in a highly
personal way-to see cases as stories written about humans. This
Article also calls for a developed consciousness when it comes to stories,
for stories do so much more than just shape our understanding about an
event. Stories justify our empathy or lack thereof. When this thinking
is applied to the practice of law and the administration of justice, the
old, formula-driven, fast-paced, impersonal system becomes unacceptable. This is so because there is a recognition that the stories are in fact
the people who are embedded into the social landscape along with each
of us. This new model requires a cognizance about the fact that docket
numbers and cases involve actual humans-just like us-who just
happen to dwell in a different place in our local, national, or global
environment and whose truths, pains, and burdens are as real as ours.
Doing this work will not be for naught. The advocated method of
administering justice will lead to more meaningful judicial outcomes and
will result in a more trusting public and a society that is not marred
with social unrest.
This Article will simultaneously explore two pivotal matters:
Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system (in twelve-person juries in noncapital cases) and the role legal storytelling plays in the delivery of and
the administration of justice.' My aim, as both a messenger and a story

1. This Article is limited to an evaluation of instances where twelve-person juries are
allowed to cast a judgment with fewer than twelve individuals voting in favor of a finding
of guilt in non-capital, criminal cases involving hard labor sentences. This Article does not
address civil jury practices and also does not address criminal juries that are composed of
less than twelve members. Notwithstanding this, it is noted that the United States
Supreme Court has determined that a non-unanimous conviction by a six-person jury
violated the defendant's right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 131-32, 137 (1979). The High Court
has also "declared that there do exist size and unanimity limits that cannot be transgressed if the essence of the jury trial right is to be maintained." Brown v. Louisiana, 447
U.S. 323, 331 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has also upheld convictions
pronounced by nine of twelve jurors. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 364-65
(1972). Yet, the Supreme Court has declared juries of five unconstitutional in criminal
trials. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978). It is the position of the High Court
that in the instance of state court, criminal trials, "the Constitution permits juries of less
than 12 members, but . . . it requires at least 6." Burch, 441 U.S. at 137. In certain
military criminal proceedings, five member juries are allowed. See United States v. Palma,
No. 38638, 2015 CCA LEXIS 444, at *30-31 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2015). A number
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teller, is to bring light where darkness has persisted and to challenge
readers to embrace the narrative versus counternarrative approach to
dispensing justice in the Deep South and beyond. After the introduction,
this Article will progress in four parts. Section II will unveil the
narrative aspects of this story about Louisiana's non-unanimous jury
system. It will serve as the substantive starting point for this conversation about justice as it relates to Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system
by providing a legal overview of the applicable protections that
Louisiana citizens have been assured. In Section III, the concept of a
counternarrative is explained and applied to this particular matter of
justice (Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system in non-capital cases).
This section will endeavor to deconstruct the narrative presented in
Section II. The aim of Section IV is to, as the Symposium theme
suggests, ensure that we learn from history and use that history to chart
our future. This is done by examining the following: how a lawyer's
professional obligations require that lawyer to act towards the end of
justice in this instance; how the refusal of the various branches of
government to correct this injustice can lead to public mistrust; and, how
inaction can cause racial tensions and outright public unrest. The
Article ends with a conclusion in Section V.
II.

THE NARRATIVE ABOUT LOUISIANA'S NON-UNANIMOUS

JURY LAw

When it comes to Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system in noncapital, criminal cases involving twelve-person juries, a narrative exists.
Those who are idealistic about America's justice system and its
accompanying narrative were not just born optimists. There are specific
laws that entice citizens to believe in the integrity of the judicial and
jury systems. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution2
states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.'

of states allow non-unanimous verdicts in civil trials. See J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of
the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1494
(1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Id.
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Louisiana's constitution follows suit. Louisiana's constitution guarantees
impartial trials" and promises the protection of life and liberty.5 It
promotes the "welfare of the people," ensures "domestic tranquility," and
promises to secure "the blessings of freedom and justice."' The
Louisiana Constitution continues:
All government ... originates with the people, is founded on their will
alone, and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual and for
the good of the whole. Its only legitimate ends are to secure justice for
all, preserve peace, protect the rights, and promote the happiness and
general welfare of the people.'
From its creation until the end of Reconstruction and the withdrawal
of federal troops, Louisiana required unanimous jury verdicts.' Majority
or non-unanimous verdicts were introduced in Louisiana in 1880 when,
at that time, defendants could be convicted by vote of only nine of twelve
jurors.? Non-unanimous verdicts made its way to the Constitution of
1898 by way of Article 116.o The citizens of Louisiana did not vote to
adopt the 1898 constitution." A legislative act granted authority to
officials to convene and create a constitution.1 2 "Both the 1913 and
1927 Constitutions reproduced nearly verbatim the provisions of Article
116 of the 1898 Constitution relating to less-than-unanimous jury verdicts." 3 "All other jury provisions, including the requirement that nine
out of twelve jurors concur when the punishment is necessarily at hard

4. See LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 16 (2005).
5. See LA. CONST. ANN. pmbl. (2005).
6. Id.
7.
8.

LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 1 (2005).
See Louisiana v. Hankton, 122 So. 3d 1028, 1031-32 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2013).
See THOMAS AIELLO, JIM CROW'S LAST STAND: NONUNANIMOUS CRIMINAL JURY

9.
VERDICTS IN LOUISIANA 12 (2015).

10. LA. CONST. art. 116 (1898); see Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1033; see also AIELLO, supra
note 9, at 9 (discussing Article 116 of Louisiana's 1879 constitution).
11. See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: HELD IN NEW ORLEANS, TUES., FEB. 8, 1898, at 384
[hereinafter LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION] (at the end of the Convention, "The
President ...
announced that one hundred and twelve delegates had signed the
Constitution in open Convention and declared that the Constitution of 1898 had been duly
signed by a majority of the delegates ... and proclaimed the Constitution of 1898 duly
adopted and ordained and delivered . . . ."); see also Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1038 (noting
that "the general electorate of Louisiana did not vote on the approval the 1898, 1913, or
1927 Constitutions").
12. See LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 1 (referencing Act
No. 52).
13. Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1038.
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current version.

The current version of Louisiana's constitution reads, in pertinent
part:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a
verdict. A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at
hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom
must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment may
be confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for
more than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, all of
whom must concur to render a verdict."5

The state code also contains a complimentary piece of legislation.

It

reads, in pertinent part:
Cases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a jury of
twelve jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in
which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be
tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to
render a verdict. Cases in which the punishment may be confinement
at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of six jurors, all of
whom must concur to render a verdict."
Oregon is much like Louisiana when it comes to legislation on nonunanimous juries.1 7
This practice is allowed there as well.'"
A

14. See id. It appears this change was made as a result of the Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972), opinion.
15. LA. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 17 (2005) (emphasis added). This version of the
constitution was passed in 1974. See Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1038 (noting that the "last
constitution that was approved by the people before the 1974 Constitution was in 1879");
see also LA. CONST. art. 116 (adopted May 12, 1898) (stating "cases in which the
punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom concurring may
render a verdict").
16. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2003) (emphasis added).
17. See Andrew Cohen, Will The Supreme Court Address Louisiana's Flawed Jury
System?, THE ATLANTIc (Apr. 23, 2014) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/
04/Louisiana/360726 ("Oregon requires a unanimous verdict in first-degree murder cases,
an 11-1 verdict in all other murder cases, and of course doesn't have the history of racial
disparity that has marked Louisiana law for centuries. So, alone in the nation, in a state
notorious for racial disparities in its justice systems, Louisiana allows a defendant to be
convicted and sentenced to life in prison without parole based upon a 10-2 vote.").
18. It also exists, in a limited way, outside of the United States. See Kelso, supra note
1, at 1493 ("Although England utilized unanimous verdicts for centuries, in 1967,
Parliament passed legislation authorizing 10-2 majority verdicts in criminal trials as long
as the jury deliberated for at least two hours. This legislation was passed after authorities
learned that several defendants associated with organized crime had been bribing and
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challenge to the Oregon system made its way to the United States
Supreme Court in 1972. That case, Apodaca v. Oregon," has been
consistently hailed a key precedent even to the present. Apodaca
involved three defendants convicted by non-unanimous juries (two by a
jury of eleven to one and one by a jury of ten to two) under a system
Their
that allowed non-unanimous juries in non-capital cases.20
challenge was brought pursuant to the Sixth21 and Fourteenth Amendments.2 2 The Supreme Court held that these convictions did not violate
the right to trial by jury specified by the Sixth Amendment and made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 3
The Supreme Court provided brief reasoning. The Court's analysis
began with the parallel it drew between the Apodaca challenge and its
1970 ruling in Williams v. Florida,24 raising the question of whether
the Sixth Amendment required all juries to consist of twelve people. In
reflection, the Court recalled that Williams concluded that a unanimous
jury was not required. 25 After this contemplation, the Court took note
of the fact that the requirement of jury unanimity arose during the
Middle Ages and had become an accepted feature of the common-law
jury by the eighteeth century. 26 Next, the Court explored the legislative history of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and then the Court pondered the function of a jury in civilized society.27
The Court said, "the purpose of trial by jury is to prevent oppression by
the Government by providing a safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge."' The court interpreted this to mean what was central to
ensuring Sixth Amendment protections were the human interplay and
commonsense judgments that flowed from the jury process and not
necessarily the number of humans that partook in this process. 2 9 In
the view of the Court, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied when there is
"a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the community

intimidating members of their juries.").
19. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
20. Id. at 405-06.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
23. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411-12.
24. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
25. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
26. Id. at 407-08.
27. See id. at 410.
28. Id. at 409-10 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 410-11.
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who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate, free from outside
attempts at intimidation . . . ."" The Court in Apodaca said there was
no functional difference in a verdict rendered by a vote of eleven to one,
ten to two, or a unanimous vote of twelve." Near the end of its
analysis, the Court entertained the argument that unanimity was
necessary to avoid convictions from happening without the acquiescence
of minority elements within the community.32 This argument was
rejected on two grounds." First, the Court declared that the Constitution only forbids systematic exclusion of identifiable segments of the
community.34 Second, the Court suggested there was no merit to the
thinking that a minority voice is not represented simply because that
viewpoint might be outvoted in the end.35
Interestingly, Justice Thurgood Marshall, a justice who spent the
earlier part of his career attacking systemic racism in the South,
dissented (along with others). Justice Marshall and the dissenters
expressed that a unanimous verdict in the state court system was an
essential element for ensuring Sixth Amendment protections." It is
also noteworthy that the Court was deeply divided over the vote in
Apodaca, with four justices dissenting.
The narrative is a story or account of events that is widely believed to
be true. The narrative can be misleading though. The narrative seems
harmless, but, when really understood, one knows that the dominant
narrative often reinforces oppression. In the case of Louisiana's nonunanimous jury system in non-capital cases, a narrative has been
created. It was shaped by the existence of legitimate laws that appear
to be race-neutral and purely written out of sheer concern for public
protection and public well-being.
At the same time the state of
Louisiana and the federal government assure specific trial protections,
Louisiana has laws on the books making it legal to convict a defendant

30. Id.
31. Id. at 411.
32. Id. at 412-13.
33. Id. at 413.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 413-14.
36. See generally id. at 414 (Stewart, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
37. See Cohen, supra note 17 ("In Apodaca, eight justices agreed that the Sixth
Amendment applied identically to the federal and state criminal trials. Four of the eight
concluded that there was no right to a unanimous jury either in federal or state
prosecutions. Four more of the eight came to the precisely opposite conclusion-that both
state and federal criminal cases had to include unanimous juries. Justice Powell split the
baby-unanimous for federal criminal trials, non-unanimous for state criminal trials-without spending great energy explaining why.").
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with less than a majority of persons on the jury voting in favor of a
conviction.
III.

THE COUNTERNARRATIVE: LEARNING FROM HISTORY

A counternarrative is a counter-story. The counternarrative is used
to give voice to people whose voice is often muted or overshadowed by
the narrative. It does not necessarily discredit the beliefs advanced by
the narrative, it merely raises differing perspectives. In terms of
assessing justice down South and charting our futures where justice is
concerned, it is my position that justice can never be achieved without
the counternarrative being a part of the equation. I espouse the view
that those who genuinely seek to achieve justice must forever be wedded
to the practice of ensuring, in every legal scenario, that no result is
reached before the narrative and the counternarrative have been placed
on par and each meaningfully considered. Using Louisiana's nonunanimous jury law, I will venture to illustrate how this is done. This
will involve exploration of the historical context of this law, a look at the
judicial response to this law, an examination of related studies and
empirical data, and attention to some equitable considerations.
A.

Historical Context

"Slavery had been introduced into the southern colonies in the 1600s
with the argument that whites, operating alone, were incapable of largescale cotton production.""
President Abraham Lincoln issued the
Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.3 This was done while
the Civil War was ongoing.' This proclamation intended to free the
slaves in Southern Confederate states.4 ' It did not do that, nor did it
end slavery. "A civil war had to be won first, hundreds of thousands of
lives lost, and then-only then-were slaves across the South set
free."4 2 Louisiana was openly hostile towards the federal government
for encroaching upon its coveted social and economic enterprise: slavery.
One manifestation of this came in the form of a 1863 Louisiana law that

38.

DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY By ANOTHER NAME 26 (2008).

39. See ProclamationNo. 95, Regarding the Status of Slaves in States Engaged in
Rebellion Against the United States, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http//www.pre
sidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69880 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
40. The Civil War began on April 12, 1861 and ended on May 9, 1865. See generally
MARGARET E. WAGNER, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ILLUSTRATED TIMELINE OF THE CIVIL

WAR (2011).
41. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDESS 20 (2010).

42.

Id.
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imposed an additional oath upon lawyers practicing in the state.4 If
a lawyer did not comply, then that lawyer was not allowed to practice in
the state." The compliant lawyers proclaimed:
I [] do solemnly swear (or affirm,) that I have not at any time since the
26th day of January, 1861, taken an oath to support the Government
or the Constitution of the United States, or in any way declared
allegiance to the United States; nor have I given any information or
support, aid or comfort to the United States, to any of its officers or
soldiers, or to any other person for the benefit of the enemy; nor have
I directly or indirectly bought or through any person gratuitously
received a certificate of allegiance to the United States, without having
taken the oath therefor, during the existence of the war waged against
the Confederate States by the United States, so help me God.'
In the following year, the Thirteenth Amendment4 6 abolished slavery.
It was ratified on December 6, 1865, several months after the Civil War
had ended." It reads, in pertinent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction."" In the Deep South, legality has
since been at a stalemate with practicality.
In the post-Civil War South, "recognition of freed slaves as full
humans appeared to most white southerners not as an extension of
liberty but as a violation of it, and as a challenge to the legitimacy of
their definition of what it was to be white." "The notion that their
farms could be operated in some manner other than with groups of black
laborers compelled by a landowner or his overseer to work as many as
twenty hours a day was antithetical to most whites." 0 "The loss of
slaves left white farm families . .. on expansive plantations . .. not just
financially but intellectually bereft.""
"The Civil War settled definitively the question of the South's
continued existence as a part of the United States, but in 1865 there was
no strategy for cleansing the South of the economic and intellectual
addiction to slavery" or the racial caste system that had governed life in

43.

See Act No. 15, 1863 La. Acts 11.

44.

See id.

45. Id.

46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
47. See generally WAGNER, supra note 40.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
49. BLACKMON, supra note 38, at 41.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id.
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the South for so long.52 "Beginning in the late 1860s . . . every
southern state enacted an array of interlocking laws essentially intended
to criminalize black life" or maintain the caste system that had long
existed in the South." In 1864, Louisiana enacted a law that allowed
for a trial to take place within forty-eight hours of notice being given to
the defendant.' In 1865, Louisiana centralized its prison operations
by moving all inmates doing hard labor sentences to the state penitentiary in the capitol, Baton Rouge." The 1865 legislature then created The
Board of Control of Louisiana Penitentiary and gave them "direction and
complete control" over the management of that facility and its inmate
population.
The legislature declared:
Prisoners shall be made to labor from sunrise to sunset throughout the
year, and shall be employed exclusively in rebuilding and repairing the
prison, the manufacture of brick, such cotton and woolen stuffs as the
present machinery can make, such mechanical pursuits as necessary
for the use of the prison, and if the Board of Control deem it proper, a
tannery may be established and operated within the enclosure."
In that same year, Louisiana passed laws making vagrancy a crime
subject to up to six months at hard labor" and subjecting individuals
to civil liability for persuading or enticing away, feeding, harboring, or
secreting a person from the employer with whom he or she contracted.5 9
The Louisiana legislature also made it legal to apprentice orphans."
In 1865, Louisiana also passed a law making it a crime to enter a
plantation without permission of the owner." Perhaps this was how
plantation owners would hide their continuation of slavery from the
public.
The number of imprisoned African Americans increased from less than
one percent before 1861 to as much as ninety percent in certain counties

52. Id. at 41.
53. Id. at 53.
54. See Act No. 42, 1864 La. Acts 60.
55. See Act No. 34, 1865 La. Acts 54.

56. See id.
57. Id. § 7; Tannery has been defined as the manufacturing and tannning of leather
and the sale of these products. See 2 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 8:139 (4th ed. 2011).
58. See Act No. 12, 1865 La. Acts 18 (crimes and offenses).
59. See Act No. 16, 1865 La. Acts 24 (providing for the punishment of persons for
tampering with, persuading or enticing away, harboring, feeding or secreting laborers,
servants, or apprentices).
60. See Act No. 19, 1865 La. Acts 28, § 1.
61. See Act No. 11, 1865 La. Acts 16.
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and states after 1865.62 The same pattern held true in Louisiana.6 3
A Louisiana newspaper editorial speaks to the coincidental nature of this
spike in crime. It says of the recently freed slaves: "His thefts, though
countless in number, have been of the pettiest character, and the sum
total of the thieving of the whole race since emancipation would not
equal, in money value, the salary grab of the late Congress." Another
newspaper praised a certain Louisiana judge for the manner he disposed
"of persons guilty of minor offenses" because he, instead of sentencing
"them to the parish jail . . . sends them to the penitentiary.""
"By the end of Reconstruction in 1877, every formerly Confederate
state except Virginia had adopted the practice of leasing black prisoners
into commercial hands."66 Louisiana's convict leasing system has been
described as: "a profit-based system that provided additional revenue to
the state" that was also "a racial caste system that provided something
resembling slavery for a crop of prisoners who were overwhelmingly
black." 7 It is believed that Louisiana first leased state prisoners to
private companies in 1866.' Louisiana officially participated in this
convict leasing system until 1901."
What was taking form in Louisiana (insofar as plotting to transfer the
newly freed slaves into the criminal justice system) did not just unfold.
It was well orchestrated by respected leaders who felt so empowered to
further their agendas that they did not feel the need to veil it. Instead,
they spoke of their intentions in as public of a forum as the Louisiana
1898 Constitutional Convention (1898 Convention). Ernest Benjamin
Kruttschnitt was a celebrated local leader and a distinguished member
of the Louisiana bar who was also a white supremacist.o One of his
greatest talents was his ability to circumvent "legal scrutiny through the

62. See DENNIS CHILDS, SLAVES OF THE STATE: BLACK INCARCERATION FROM THE
CHAIN GANG To THE PENITENTIARY 9 (2015).
63. See AIELLO, supra note 9, at 10 (mentioning that, in Louisiana, the "abolition of
slavery changed the penitentiary from a predominately white institution to one that was
majority black" and it changed the nature of "prison work from industrial to agricultural
...
as white politicians sought to reinstitute a form of control over its newly freed
workforce.").
64. Future of the Freedman, THE DAILY PICAYUNE, Aug. 31, 1873, at 5.
65. Louisiana Opinions, THE DAILY PICAYUNE, Mar. 8, 1897, at 12.
66. BLACKMON, supra note 38, at 56.
67. AIELLO, supra note 9, at 11-12.
68. See Slavery By Another Name Timeline and Map, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tpt/sla
very-by-another-name/slavery-timeline/#1ouisiana (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
69. See BLACKMON, supra note 38, at 351.
70. See Bidish Sarma, An Enduring (and Disturbing) Legacy: "Race-Neutrality,"
JudicialApathy, and the Civic Exclusion of African-Americans In Louisiana, 1 HLRE 49,
49-50 (2011).
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deployment of race-neutral language in the laws he drafted and the
Constitution he helped create."n Kruttschnitt was president of the
1898 Convention. 2 "The 134 delegates in the 1898 Convention were
all white."" This convention was held at a time when the state needed
to be rebuilt as a result of the Civil War. The pressing issues to be
settled at the 1898 Convention were voting rights (suffrage), creation of
a public education system, and criminal justice. Kruttschnitt and others
involved with the authorship of the legislation that came out of the 1898
Convention "achieved their goal with the law, rather than against it." 5
The record of the 1898 Convention captures those in attendance
expressing that they favored "radical change in the judicial system of the
State."7 ' As for what they wanted, they expressed: "We need a system
better adapted to the peculiar conditions existing in our State."" They
continued: "[E]fficiency should be the first and primary consideration;
economy should be secondary."" During the 1898 Convention, they
established the first-ever board of control over all charitable and
correctional institutions." Where corrections were concerned, this
board placed tremendous powers in the hands of a few. At the end of
the ninety-four-day convention, Thomas J. Semmes addressed the 1898
Convention and shared these trenchant closing remarks, in pertinent
part:
Now then, what have we done? . .. Our mission was, in the first place,
to establish the supremacy of the white race .... We have established
. . . white manhood suffrage ....
Now, what is section 5 [of the
ordinance on suffrage]? . . . It is a declaration upon the part of this
Convention, that no white man in this State-that's the effect but not
the language-that no white man in this State who has heretofore
exercised the right of suffrage shall be deprived of it, whether or not
he can read or write, or whether he possesses the property qualification
.... Now, why was this exception made? ... Louisiana is one of the
most illiterate States in the Union . . . . We, therefore, have in this

71.

Id. at 50.

72.

See LouIsIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 12.

73.

Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1034.
See LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 31 (On the
conversation of public education, it was said that "[t]he most revolting scheme which was
suggested and urged, most irritating and dangerous, was the proposition for mixed schools,
the co-education of the races, the late masters and the late slaves, Caucasian and African,
in the same schools and with the same teachers.").
75. Sarma, supra note 70, at 49, 54 (emphasis in original).
76. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 76.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 378.
74.
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State a large white population whose right to vote would have been
Now these
stricken down, but for the operation of section 5 ....
people, these simple, good people, whose ancestors have been living
there for a hundred and fifty years, surrounded by circumstances
which debared them from all the advantages of education, could any
man with a heart in his breast be willing to strike them down and
reduce them to the condition of the black race . . ."'

While much of the above-quoted language involves voting, an entirely
different topic from non-unanimous juries, the text goes far in exposing
intentions and even further in capturing the fact that there was a
finesse about drafting what appeared to be race-neutral legislation,
which was, in fact, legislation that was racist to the core. With this
understanding, the conversation of non-unanimous juries cannot be
trivialized or easily dismissed as the work of conspiracy theorists
consumed with thoughts of racist plots.
In addition to the financial and social incentives for Louisiana's nonunanimous laws, there were also documented fears about blacks serving

on juries. In the words of a Louisiana citizen who authored a postemancipation editorial about African Americans serving on juries when
another African American was on trial: "[H]e becomes at once his
earnest champion, and a hung jury is the usual result.""' Another said

the recently emancipated were "wholly ignorant of the responsibilities
of jurors, unable to discriminate between truth and falsehood in
testimony, and capable only of being corrupted by bribes."8 2
B.

JudicialResponse

Prior to 1972, unanimity was a constitutional requirement.

As of

1972, the High Court gave its endorsement to non-unanimous verdicts,

finding that they "did not interfere with the meaningful participation of
any of the various segments of society, assuming that juries would

continue deliberations until all issues were fully discussed."

In the

case of this law and the state judicial branch, defendants and some

lawyers have consistently approached the judicial system for help in
post-Apodaca days." Mindful of a 1979 United States Supreme Court

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
second
labor).

Id. at 374-75.
Future of the Freedman,supra note 64.
The PresentJury System, THE DAILY PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 1870, at 4.
See Kelso, supra note 1, at 1493.
Id. at 1494.
See, e.g., Louisiana v. Belgard, 410 So. 2d 720, 726, 727 (La. 1982) (convicted of
degree murder by a verdict of eleven to one and sentenced to twelve years at hard
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decision,86 holding that a conviction by a non-unanimous six person
jury for a non-petty offense violates an individual's right to a trial by
jury, some have tried to have that holding extended to twelve-person
juries in non-capital cases.8 1 Some have contended Louisiana's nonunanimous jury laws are illegal because they are contrary to the
obligation Louisiana assumed upon admission into the Union 8 or
because they compromise ample consideration of a case.
Some have
complained Louisiana's laws increase "the likelihood of a wrongful
conviction and remove a crucial safeguard against convicting innocent
men and women."' Others have claimed their non-capital convictions
by non-unanimous juries amount to "cruel, excessive or unusual punishment."
Some have asserted general constitutional challenges.92
Some have specifically argued the law violates the right to a trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
or violates either the Due Process Clause" or the Equal Protection
Clause, or both,94 as guaranteed by the Fifth" and Fourteenth Amend-

86. In Burch, the Court held that unanimity is constitutionally required where a jury
is composed of only six persons. 441 U.S. at 137.
87. See Louisiana v. Green, 390 So. 2d 1253, 1260-61 (La. 1980) (where a man convicted
of armed robbery raised a constitutional challenge and argued that the reasoning in Burch
applied to a twelve person jury as well); Louisiana v. Jones, 381 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. 1980)
(in this case, a man convicted of armed robbery by a verdict of ten to two, the court
distinguished the unanimity required of a six person jury).
88. See Louisiana v. Carey, 506 So. 2d 813, 815 (La. 1987) (deeming that "an act for the
admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union, does not require that the . . . state
constitution and statutes be identical with the federal unanimous jury requirements"
(quoting Louisiana v. Hodges, 349 So. 2d 250, 260 (La. 1977))).
89. See Louisiana v. Blow, 46 So. 3d 735, 751 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2010) (convicted of
solicitation of murder by a verdict of ten to two and sentenced to fifteen years at hard
labor).
90. Brief for Innocence Project New Orleans as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 1, Jackson v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 2321 (2015) (No. 14-8850), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1462, at *1.
91. Louisiana v. Morning, 149 So. 3d 925, 931 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014) (convicted of
aggravated rape by a verdict of ten to two and sentenced to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment).
92. See Louisiana v. Robinson, 106 So. 3d 1028, 1031, 1031-32, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 2012) (convicted of armed robbery by a verdict of ten to two and sentenced to life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence);
Louisiana v. Blanchard, No. 2010 KA 0014, 2010 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 417, at *1, *2
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. July 8, 2010) (convicted of several counts of indecent behavior with
a juvenile).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ments to the United States Constitution." Some have, rather cleverly,
argued that two of twelve jurors declining to convict constitutes proof
that reasonable doubt exists." Some defendants have even directly
challenged these laws based on their racist roots." In almost all of
96. See Louisiana v. Brown, 173 So. 3d 1262, 1266, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015)
(convicted of armed robbery and aggravated flight from an officer by a verdict of eleven to
one and a seventy-seven year sentence was imposed); Louisiana v. Odowd, No. 2013 KA
1107, 2014 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 175, at *2, *10 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Mar. 24, 2014)
(convicted of two counts of aggravated incest and sentenced to twenty-five years at hard
labor without the benefit of parole); Louisiana v. Williams, 93 So. 3d 830, 832, 836 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2012) (convicted of second degree murder by a verdict of eleven to one and
sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence); Louisiana v. Barnett, 70 So. 3d 1, 2, 4 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2011) (convicted of
one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder by
a verdict of ten to two and sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence); Louisiana v. Johnson, 57 So. 3d 1087, 1089, 1098-99
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2011) (convicted of second degree murder by a verdict of ten to two
and a life sentence was imposed); Louisiana v. Juniors, 918 So. 2d 1137, 1138, 1147 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2005) (convicted of second degree murder by a vote of eleven to one and
sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor); Louisiana v.
Williams, 747 So. 2d 1256, 1261 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1999) (convicted of armed robbery
and second degree kidnapping by a ten to two vote); Louisiana v. Conway, 556 So. 2d 1323,
1324, 1329-30 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (convicted of aggravated rape by a verdict of ten
to two and sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without
the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence); Louisiana v. Simmons, 414 So.
2d 705, 706, 707 (La. 1982) (unanimously convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six
years at hard labor); Brief of Amicus Curiae for The Houston Institute for Race and Justice
in Support of Petitioner at 2, Louisiana v. Lee, 555 U.S. 823 (2008) (No. 07-1523), 2008 WL
2682524, at *2.
97. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 359; Johnson, 57 So. 3d at 1098 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2011); Louisiana v. Shanks, 715 So. 2d 157, 164 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998)
(convicted of second degree murder by a verdict of ten to two); Louisiana v. Stott, 395 So.
2d 714, 715 (La. 1981) (two defendants convicted of simple burglary of a pharmacy and
sentenced to fifteen years and eight years at hard labor without the benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence); see also Ralph Slovenko, Control Over the Jury
Verdict in Louisiana CriminalLaw, 20 LA. L. REV. 657, 681 (1960).
98. See Louisiana v. King, No. 2013 KA 0135, 2014 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409, at *62,
*64 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. July 10, 2014) (arguing that a 2010 United States Supreme Court
decision "left no doubt that all of the incorporated Bill of Rights protections have identical
application against state and federal governments" and, upon this reasoning, asserted that
Apodaca is no longer good law), rev'd, 172 So. 3d 639 (La. 2015); Odowd, 2014 La. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 175, at *10 (contending that "racial discrimination was a substantial and
motivating factor behind enactment" of the state constitutional provision); Louisiana v.
Dorsey, 137 So. 3d 651, 654 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014) (arguing that the applicable
legislative enactments were "motivated by an express and overt desire to discriminate and
has had a racially discriminatory impact since its adoption"); Louisiana v. Bertrand, 6 So.
3d 738, 738, 742 (La. 2009) (arguing that "the use of non-unanimous verdicts have an
insidious racial component, allow minority viewpoints to be ignored, and is likely to chill
participation by the precise groups whose exclusion the Constitution has proscribed"); see
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these instances, the courts have responded identically and have been
consistently dismissive. The courts have refused to probe or entertain
challenges, and the reviewing courts have done so by way of opinions
that induce a belief that a quick, impersonal, and routine judicial
formula was applied. The equation would look something like this:
mention race and Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system in non-capital
case reply with a quick reference to the 1972 Apodaca v. Oregon"
case = deny relief. This is what "justice" has looked like for years when
it comes to this issue. Of the few cases that have been considered by the
Louisiana courts, two command attention: Louisiana v. Bertrand'oo
and Louisiana v. Hankton.'0o
In Bertrand, cases brought by two separate defendants who were
sentenced to hard labor were consolidated for consideration of their
respective constitutional challenges to Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 782.102 These challenges were raised by motions to
declare the statute unconstitutional on Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.o" The district court granted their motions and,
in so doing, declared Louisiana's laws unconstitutional.'" The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this decision.'o
In its analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the abovereferenced state legislation along with the applicable state and federal
jurisprudence.'0 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court was rather explicit in
its criticism of the district court for its "nonexistent" reasoning.' 0 7
After doing so, the court revealed that it had located a related lower
court ruling to consult for insight, then the supreme court complained
that those "reasons consisted of a rambling diatribe with no discernable
legal analysis. . . ."os The court then raised a concern over the fact
that the district court had, prior to its ruling in Bertrand, consistently
upheld the constitutionality of Louisiana's laws in the face of the

also Motion for Unanimous Jury Verdict, at 3 n.4, Louisiana v. Woodfox, No. 15-WFLN-088
(20th Jud. Dist. Sept. 21, 2015) (on file with the author); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at
6, Louisiana v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 1238 (2013), 2012 WL 5375602 (arguing that "Louisiana's
law . . . is a vestige of Jim Crow politics").

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
because
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

406 U.S. 404 (1972).
6 So. 3d 738 (La. 2009).
122 So. 3d 1028 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2013).
LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 782.
See Bertrand,6 So. 3d at 738-39 (deeming the Fifth Amendment challenge waived
the issue had not been argued or briefed).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 741.
See id.
Id.
Id. (referring to the reasoning in State v. Wilkins, No. 2008-KA-0887).
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identical challenges.o' Next, the court considered the two arguments
before it, the first argument being the questionable validity of Apodaca
in light of recent Sixth Amendment rulings.o The final argument it
considered was the insidious racial component in the use of nonunanimous verdicts, allowing minority viewpoints to be ignored, and
likely chilling participation by the precise groups whose exclusion the
Constitution has proscribed."' After framing the conversation in such
a detailed way, the court abruptly ended the discussion by doing exactly
what it complained of at the start of its analysis." 2 It did not attempt
a particularized response to these arguments." 3 It gave no analysis
whatsoever.11 4 It simply concluded the discussion by saying that these
same arguments have been unsuccessfully raised in the past."'
This case is instructive for reasons far beyond traditional judicial
indicators. This case showcases the level of probing that has taken place
in response to an argument that involves the most quintessential traits
of humanity: value for life and liberty. Though not expressly said, the
court seemed to have taken the position that an associated prior ruling
precluded any further discussion of the topic, ever. If this were the case,
one is left to wonder how expansion of law could ever happen. Oliver
Wendell Holmes spoke to this when he said:
The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience .

.

.. The

law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as though it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know
what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to
become."'
In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "when governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned," courts can depart from
precedent."' "Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it

109.
110.

Id. at 742.
Id. at 741-42.

111. Id. at 743.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

116. ALFRED H. KNIGHT, THE LIFE OF THE LAw: THE PEOPLE AND CASES THAT HAVE
SHAPED OUR SOCIETY, FROM KING ALFRED TO RODNEY KING 1 (1996) (alteration in orginal)
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881)).
117. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
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'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision.'" 118
Even more concerning is the fact that the court in Bertrand, when
confronted with a challenge to the insidious racial component of
Louisiana laws, suggested there was no need to have that conversation
because that question was settled in Apodaca. How could this be when
Apodaca did not even involve Louisiana's law and Apodaca never
considered the unique issues surrounding the timing of Louisiana's law
and the accompanying affairs in the South relating to the loss of a free
labor system? How could Apodaca have considered this legal issue in a
meaningful way when much of the data at our disposal did not even
exist in 1972 when Apodaca was decided?" Additionally, if Apodaca
is not factually analogous, how can it be exalted as binding precedent?
As such, did the Bertrand court have grounds to distinguish the cases
and, in turn, act in the interests of justice? Did the Bertrand court see
only the narrative (and ignore the counternarrative)?
The next Louisiana case of concern is Hankton. Hankton involves the
2013 appeal of a man convicted by ten of twelve jurors. One aspect of
that appeal involved Telly Hankton's challenge to Louisiana's nonunanimous jury scheme on Sixth Amendment and equal protection
grounds.1 20 Specifically, he argued that "racial animus and discrimination toward African Americans were the substantial or motivating
factors in Louisiana's introduction and first-time adoption of the nonunanimous jury provisions in 1898."121 Determining that Hankton did
not request an evidentiary hearing at the trial court and, by way of this
omission, failed to preserve the issue for appellate review, the court of
appeals decided not to evaluate Hankton's constitutional challenge.1 2 2
After its ruling, the court spent the next fourteen pages of the opinion
doing what appears to be an evaluation of the issue it said it would not
consider.123 It reached a conclusion, though it said it was never
hearing the issue, that Hankton failed to meet his initial burden of proof
on demonstrating disparate impact (by not showing any evidence that
the law, as applied to him, has a disparate impact). 1 24

118. Id. at 828 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
119. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 230 ("[R]ecognizing that by 1970 little empirical research
had evaluated jury performance . . . .").
120. See Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1029.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 1032.

123. See generally id. at 1032-42.
124.

Id. at 1041-42.
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The court immediately stated, because of Bertrand, it was foreclosed
from so much as considering the Sixth Amendment challenge."
However, the court indicated that was not the case when arguing that
Louisiana's scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 26 The court explained, had the issue been before
it for consideration, the starting point would be with the reality that
constitutional provisions are presumed constitutional. 12 7 The court
said it would first look to see if Hankton met his initial burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality.12 8 The court next
explained exactly what Hankton would have to show in order to
successfully prevail as to an equal protection challenge: both a racially
disproportionate impact and a discriminatory motive on the part of the
lawmaker.'2 9 The court remarked, if Hankton met his burden, the
burden would then shift to the State to show that the same provision
would have been enacted absent the established discriminatory
intent. 13

Next, the court turned its attention to some of the specifics surrounding the 1898 Convention, such as, in the view of the court, the candid
racist intentions of many of those involved."' The court found it
significant that voting statistics were considered in determining the
number of concurring jurors needed to return a verdict-as this law was
envisioned-insofar as the 1898 Convention numbers of registered voters
hinted to the number of blacks that might serve on juries and, in the
minds of state officials, cast favorable votes for African American
defendants.' 32 The court did not silence the fact that an aspect of this
lawmaking involved the concern over "white majority control over jury
verdicts. .. ."" The court characterized the 1898 Convention as an
"atmosphere of hate" and observed that the legislation at issue was
enacted in this environment "as part of a raft of deliberately discriminatory measures."'" Bearing all this in mind, the court speculated that

125. Id. at 1032.
126. See id. at 1035.
127. Id. at 1032.
128. Id.
129. Id. Hankton took issue with this legal standard. In his view, a showing of
disparate impact was not needed to establish an equal protection violation. See Brief for
Appellant at 5-6, Louisiana v. Hankton, 122 So. 3d 1028 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2013) (No.
2012-KA-0375), 2012 WL 2924450, at *5-6.
130. Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1033.
131. Id. at 1034.
132. Id. at 1035.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1028, 1033, 1035.
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the burden of showing a racial motivation for the law could be met,
which would then shift the burden to the State to show that the nonunanimous jury scheme would have passed were there no racial
motivation.'a' Meeting this burden, in the view of the court, would
have required the use of experts by Hankton and the request for a
hearing on the part of Hankton, which was not done.136
The court, though it said it was not reviewing Hankton's constitutional
challenge, entertained Hankton's argument that he should prevail
because in Hunter v. Underwood'. an Alabama law, with the same
The court
post-reconstruction racial history, was struck down."
disagreed with this attempt to have a Louisiana court, on the face of the
Alabama opinion, render a finding of unconstitutionality. 39 The court
observed what it deemed material differences and those were that
Alabama's district court had testimony and opinions of historians before
it, along with statistics and official records that were considered at the
trial court level in Alabama's Hunter case, and that Alabama was still
using the tainted 1901 constitution at the time of the challenge (whereas
Louisiana had adopted other versions of its constitution since the 1898
version passed).1 40
The court, though still not reviewing Hankton's constitutional
challenge, responded to his argument that subsequent constitutions have
not changed the less-than-unanimous scheme, so the original racial
animus continues to this day.14' The court took an extensive look at
the history surrounding Louisiana's 1974 constitution and rested on the
fact that a 1973 debate over the unanimous jury system took place
wherein opposing viewpoints were aired (and a change from the prior
system of nine to the current system of ten to convict took place).1 4 2
The court even noted there was no mention of race during the 1973-1974
process. 4 3 The court noted that state officials, during the 1973-1974
process, said their motivation for maintaining the non-unanimous jury
system was judicial efficiency.'" These things, in the view of the
court, somehow suggested that something more genuine took place and
what was done in the past was not just furthered with bad intentions or

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1035-36.
Id.
471 U.S. 222 (1985).
Hankton, 122 So. 3d at 1037.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1037-38.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
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without concern for the best of the people of Louisiana.1 4 5 The court
concluded, "Even if racial bias was the original motive behind the lessthan-unanimous jury verdict's introduction in 1898, the motive in 1973
was clearly judicial efficiency."1 46
Though none of the court's discussion is binding since, technically, it
never considered Hankton's constitutional challenge, some aspects of this
opinion carry tremendous weight when it comes to questions of future
justice. The first is the court's naive reasoning that the absence of racial
references in the 1973-1974 process somehow suggests an absence of bad
intentions or the sanitizing of a treacherous past. This is alarming. The
absence of a transcript that explicitly captures racist lawmakers acting
out a racist plot could mean the absence of racism as much as it could
mean the presence of lawmakers who act with greater sophistication
where their intentions are concerned. It appears the court overlooked
this, and this is no small detail. Second to this concern is the legal
standard that the court imposed on a man convicted of second degree
murder. The subliminal message communicated was that there is a
burden of proof and it is virtually impossible to prove by a free person
with unlimited resources, but there is an expectation that if a cure to a
flawed practice is to be found, it rests on the shoulders of prisoners and
not upon the shoulders of officials who are duty-bound to protect citizens
and act in their best interest. This is not to suggest defendants should
not bear burdens of proof and courts should not hold defendants to them.
This is to call attention to how comfortable it can be to close a "case"
when a "case" involves a "defendant."
Lastly, the court seemingly was comforted by the official record of the
1974 constitution indicating that Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system
is in place to achieve judicial efficiency. The court seemed to have found
this more palatable than an expressed racial motivation (as was the case
in 1898). I do not. In fact, I see this as a difference without a distinction because the delegates at the 1898 Convention, as previously noted,
prefaced their actions with these words: "efficiency should be the first
and primary consideration." 4 1 I also find this the same conversation
given the fact that the majority of Louisiana's prison population is
In this regard, judicial efficiency suggests the
African American.14

145.
146.

Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1041.

LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 76.
148. As of March 2015, The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
reported 67.8% of its population of offenders as being African American, 31.4% as being
Caucasian, and 0.8% as being other. See DemographicProfiles of the Adult Correctional
147.

Population:Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & FINANCE

INFORMATION SERVICES (Mar.
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aim is to obtain disposition of criminal cases faster. In a state like
Louisiana where sentences are harsh, this is as offensive as an explicit
racial slur on the official records. This is a discussion about criminal
law, which means a "person's" liberty is being discussed. At no time
should these things ever be discussed in the same sentence with judicial
efficiency.
C.

Studies and EmpiricalDatal49

This is not much to do about numbers. In the case of jury delibera"[N1on-unanimous jury
tions, the size of a jury really does matter.'
verdicts in criminal cases create a qualitatively lesser form ofjustice and
hold the potential to marginalize the views of women and people of color
as they fulfill their obligations to serve on juries."'"' "A twelve-headed
decision-maker has an astonishing memory, a vast fund of common
experience, hugely versatile analytic skills, and the counterpressures of
opposed extremes of opinion, which drive its judgments toward the
middle ground of rational moderation."1 52 Scientific research furthers
this view.
In a 1977 study by psychologist and law professor Michael J. Saks,
Ph.D., designed to explore group decision-making-participants were put
in mock juries of six or twelve, shown a videotaped trial, and asked to

31, 2015), http://www.doc.1a.gov/quicklinks/statistics/statistics-briefing-book/#pe; see also
State of Black New Orleans: 10 Years Post-Katrina 35, URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER NEW
ORLEANS, http://www.urbanleagueneworleans.org/ul/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) ("Of the
50 states, Louisiana is number one in incarceration rates.").
149. This section seeks to enlighten the reader of research that induces a belief that
a non-unanimous jury system is not the best manner of achieving a fair process for the
defendant. This section does not purport to contain all of the research on the topics ofjuror
persuasion or group decision-making, nor does it seek to explore research suggesting a
contrary finding. That research does exist. It has been omitted because the aim was not
to recognize the fact that different views of research exist. The aim was to recognize the
view that some research suggests that the voice of one or two individuals on a jury can
matter when it comes to deliberations.
150. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 332 (1980); Ballew, 435 U.S. at 230-39
(extensively discussing empirical data that compared smaller and larger juries); Michael
H. Glasser, Letting The Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts In Criminal
Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1997) (discussing a study that found six differences
between unanimous-rule juries and majority-rule juries); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS: AMERICAN JURY PROJECT at 18-20, www.ameri

canbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/juryprojectstandards/principles.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, State v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 1238
(2013), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs, at *11-12 (discussing a number of studies and findings).
151. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Houston Institute for Race and Justice in Support
of Petitioner, supra note 96, at *2.
152. KNIGHT, supra note 116, at 254.
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deliberate to a verdict.'"' This study determined that members of
smaller groups shared more equally in the discussion, found the
deliberations more satisfying, and were more cohesive.154 It found that
larger groups were more contentious, debated more vigorously, collectively recalled more evidence from the trial, and made more consistent and
predictable decisions."'
The lesson learned from this study was that
"as juries grow smaller, in criminal cases they will make more errors of
acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent.""' A later study by
three social scientists that led to a book entitled, Inside the Jury,5
reached similar results.' Specifically, Inside the Jury found:
[Blehavior in unanimous rule juries contrasts with typical behavior in
majority rule juries in six respects: deliberation time (majority rule
juries take less time to render verdicts), small faction participation
(members of small factions are less likely to speak under majority
rules), faction growth rates (large factions attract members more
rapidly under majority rules), holdouts (jurors are more apt to be
holdouts at the end of deliberation under majority rules), time of voting
(majority rule juries tend to vote sooner), and deliberation style
(majority rule juries are slightly likelier to adopt a verdict-driven
deliberation style in contrast to the evidence-driven style).

. .

. Verdict

driven juries vote early and organize discussion in an adversarial
manner around verdict-favoring factions, as opposed to evidence-driven
juries which defer voting and start with a relatively united discussion
of evidence, turning to verdict categories later in deliberation. 59
'
Consistent with this, "modern empirical research has demonstrated
that unanimous juries are more careful, more thorough, and return
verdicts that are more in line with what experienced observers of the
criminal justice system . . . view to be the correct verdict." 16o

153. See Are Six Heads as Good as Twelve?, Am. PSYCHOL. Ass'N (May 28, 2004),
http://www.apa.org/research/action/jury.aspx.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
158. Id. at 229 (finding that "the unanimous rule appears preferable to majority rules").
159. Stephen Saltzburg, UnderstandingThe Jury With The Help of Social Science, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1120, 1129 (1985) (alterations in orginal).
160. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Houston Institute for Race and Justice in Support
of Petitioner, supra note 96, at *4.
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Equitable Considerations

Interestingly in federal criminal proceedings, jury verdicts must oe
unanimous. "' Though not discussed in the opinion, one of the practical implications of Apodaca is that the Sixth Amendment now has a
different meaning under the state criminal system than it does under
the federal criminal system where juror unanimity is required. From an
equitable standpoint, this means the same acts can result in a conviction
in state courts that can end in freedom in the federal courts. This defies
logic. A wrong should be a wrong based on reason and not based upon
a geographical or systematic gamble. When it comes to a six-person
state criminal jury, it must be unanimous in order to satisfy constitutional safeguards. 1 2
In resolving the question of whether nonunanimous juries should be allowed in the instance of a six-person jury,
the Supreme Court aired this concern:
It appears that of those States that utilize six-member juries in trials
of nonpetty offenses, only two, including Louisiana, also allow
nonunanimous verdicts. We think that this near-uniform judgment of
the Nation provides a useful guide in delimiting the line between those
jury practices that are constitutionally permissible and those that are
not. 163
From an equitable standpoint, is it logical for the attention to be on the
differing two states, or would it be more sound to focus the analysis of
the cohesive actions of the other forty-eight states? It would seem that
the actions of the forty-eight states would be more of an indicator of the
pulse of the nation and certainly a basis for judicial action.
There have been suggestions that, in making charging decisions,
prosecutors often consider Louisiana's non-unanimous jury law.'64 The
thinking is that prosecutors see it as easier to convince less than a
majority of jurors to convict. Practically speaking, under the current
system, "[a]nyone charged with a crime in Louisiana is more likely to be
convicted than in any other state, save Oregon."' The terms "United"
and "States" actually mean something when used together. Together,

161.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).

162. See Burch, 441 U.S. at 138.
163. Id. (footnote omitted).
164. See State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663 (La. 1982) (wherein a woman convicted of
manslaughter by a verdict of eleven to one and sentenced to ten years at hard labor

unsuccessfully argued, on appeal, that the district attorney intentionally requested an
indictment for second degree murder in order to avoid the unanimous verdict requirement

in a prosecution for first degree murder).
165.

AIELLO, supra note 9, at xi.
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they suggest that we are united as interconnected nations where our
values are concerned. The current practice in Louisiana calls this into
question as it simultaneously communicates to the other states that the
liberties of their citizens will not be as carefully guarded in the state of
Louisiana. This cannot be good for public relations or for alliance
building.
One might also conclude that Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system
in non-capital cases contributes to racist jury practices. In the words of
Louisiana lawyer Christopher Aberle,
This is so because a prosecutor, or a defendant for that matter, who is
of a mind to strike black jurors need only strike enough black jurors to
make sure that ten white jurors remain. In other words, the nonunanimous-jury system readily facilitates effective Batson violations while
making it easy to conceal discriminatory intent.'
In a state where laws are supposed to be made by the legislature, these
Louisiana lawyers have created their own local exception to United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence governing discrimination in jury
selection. Practically speaking, they are legislating when no one voted
them into office to perform this task. Not only does this undermine the
legislative process, this is bad for every citizen wishing to serve on a
Louisiana jury and even worse for Louisiana citizens whose fate depends
on the integrity of the jury that decides their case.
All these considerations shape the counternarrative, and the counternarrative balances and completes the story. When given parity with the
counternarrative, the narrative is a person of interest in this case
against justice.
IV.

CHARTING OUR FUTURE: JUSTICE ON TRIAL

The insights to be gained from this story are abounding. Those who
are serious about charting our futures as a justice community should
begin with an understanding of how few people are in a position, under
our scheme of government, to address this particular injustice. With

166. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Louisiana v. Hankton, 122 So. 3d 1035 (2013) (No.
2012-KA-0375), 2012 WL 2924450, at *4; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Houston
Institute for Race and Justice in Support of Petitioner, supra note 96, at *4. ("[Plermitting
non-unanimous criminal verdicts can serve as a de facto means of allowing majorities of
jurors to prevent minority jurors from jury participation, thereby undermining important
Constitutional principles regarding equality in jury service that this Court has taken
considerable measures to protect in recent years."); Cohen, supra note 17 ("[Plrosecutors
can comply with their constitutional obligations to permit blacks and other minority
citizens to serve as jurors but then effectively nullify the votes of those jurors should they
vote to acquit.").
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that understanding, it is of paramount importance that those entrusted
with power realize why they have it and also realize the consequences
of not using it or of abusing it. When it comes to justice, transgressing
by abusing power is as bad as transgressing by not using power. Dr.
Martin Luther King warned of this:
More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much
more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to
repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions
of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people.
Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes
through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co-workers with God,
and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of
social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that
the time is always ripe to do right.'
I begin with a look at who has power to fashion a solution to this
injustice. The federal government distributes government powers
amongst only three branches of government: judicial, legislative, and
executive."'
The state of Louisiana follows an identical structure. 6 9
This suggests a solution might likely rest within one of these branches.
Louisiana's legislative branch is unique.
Unlike other states,
Louisiana is not a common law jurisdiction. Louisiana is a civil law
jurisdiction.'7 0 In a civil law jurisdiction, a high premium is placed on
laws and legislation, and on ensuring that lawmaking is the exclusive
function of the legislature (as opposed to the executive or judicial
branches).17' "In civil law jurisdictions, legislation is superior to every
other source of law." 7 2 According to Louisiana law, legislative instruments are presumed constitutional."' While Louisiana's civil code
system envisions a system of law that is steady and constant, it also
contemplates the expansion and evolution of law. In those instances,
conventional wisdom suggests "a sufficient safeguard is found in the
legislative faculty of amending the law.""'
Given the tremendous

167. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 74 (Signet Classic 2000) (1964).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I-art. III.
169. See LA. CONST. ANN. art. II, § 1 (2005).
170. See generally LA. Civ. CODE (2013).
171. See LA. CIV. CODE XLV (2013) (referencing Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Chas
E. Fenner, Address at the Louisiana Bar Association Meeting: The Civil Code of Louisiana
as a Democratic Institution (May 7, 1904)).
172. LA. CIV. CODE LXVII (2013) (citing A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, 2008 COMPILED EDITION
OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA (2008)).
173. See State v. Webb, 144 So. 3d 971, 976 (La. 2014).
174. LA. Civ. CODE XLV (referencing Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Chas E. Fenner,
Address at the Louisiana Bar Association Meeting: The Civil Code of Louisiana as a
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weight of legislation and the legal impediments to challenging the
constitutionality of laws, it would seem that the responsibility of
addressing Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system would best lie with
the legislature, but it has done nothing in the way of correcting a flawed
and infected legislative scheme.
Insofar as the judicial branch is concerned, there is the issue of courts
and then there is the separate issue of individual lawyers. The United
States Supreme Court has been consistently approached in the postApodaca days. The court simply refused to involve itself with this issue.
Even after the American Bar Association (ABA) filed a recent amicus
brief explaining, amongst other things, that an Apodaca concurrence
referenced a 1968 ABA standard, which lent support to non-unanimous
criminal juries in state trials that had, after the emergence of additional
data, been amended in 1976 to indicate that criminal verdicts in state
proceedings should be unanimous, the Supreme Court remained
silent.' 7 r This notion was previously expressed when malevolent
Louisiana legislation was under attack before the United States
Supreme Court. At times where southern states are acting out racist
tendencies through the use of "sinister legislation . . . to place [certain
citizens] in a condition of legal inferiority, . . . [s]uch a system . . . may
be stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the
discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land
. 176 In spite of, or because of, inaction by the High Court, state
courts could contribute to a solution. They can fulfill their roles as
interpreters of law by giving a meaningful look at the challenges brought
before it. Instead, state courts have impulsively and ritualistically
repeated a script to defendants suggesting they cannot help because of
prior jurisprudence.
Insofar as lawyers acting on behalf of the state, many have defended
the practice and all have ignored the implications of the specific racial
implications of Louisiana's laws. Some have defended the practice as a
way of furthering the goals of federalism by ensuring diversity is
"fostered and encouraged for the health and resiliency of our society."'7 7 Shockingly, officials have even defended non-unanimous juries
"because of the time this procedure saves everyone connected with the

Democratic Institution (May 7, 1904)).
175. See Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA Amicus Brief Backs Unanimous Verdicts in
CriminalCases, ABA J. (Jan. 3,2011), http//www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba amicus
brief_backsunanimous verdictsincriminalcases/.
176. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
177. Brief for Respondent at 14, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (No. 78-90),
1978 WL 206959, at *14.
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criminal justice process.""
Interestingly, Walter Reed, a former
district attorney for the 22nd Judicial District covering St. Tammany
and Washington parishes, who has defended Louisiana's law1 7 1 is now
under federal indictment for wire fraud, money laundering, mail fraud,
and tax evasion charges. 8 o It would be interesting to see his reaction to his case being heard by a non-unanimous jury, but we will
never gain that insight because, in the same America in which the
unsuccessful defendants live, he will be afforded different protections
since he is being prosecuted in federal court where unanimous juries
are required.
The executive has stayed clear of the opportunity to act out a
leadership role for the people of Louisiana despite that being the very
nature of this post.1 8 1 Most of what has been spoken on behalf of
this branch in the days after Apodaca has come from the various state
attorney generals who have vigorously opposed constitutional
challenges.1 8 2 In Louisiana, the attorney general is "the chief legal
officer of the state."' This means several of the chief legal officers
have defended legislation designed by racists with bad intentions that
currently has documented adverse implications. If that is the practice
of the chief legal officers, something is to be said when it comes to
notions of justice in this southern state.
The Bar also shares responsibility. This situation was largely
originated by lawyers. It has continued because of the efforts of some
lawyers and on the watch of lawyers. This is significant. A lawyer is
"an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special

178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Odowd, 2014 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 175, at *1-2 (convicted of two
counts of aggravated incest and sentenced to twenty-five years of hard labor without the
benefit of parole).
180. See Robert Rhoden, Trial of Former North Shore DA Walter Reed Pushed Back to
April, NOLA.COM: THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.
ssf/2015/10/trial of_formernorthshoreda.html#incartriver.
181. Louisiana's executive branch consists of the governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, commissioner
of insurance, superintendent of education, commissioner of elections, and all other
executive offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the state. See LA. CoNST. ANN. art. IV,
§ 1 (A) (2005).
182. See, e.g., Bertrand,6 So. 3d at 738 (Attorney General James D. "Buddy" Caldwell);
Williams, 747 So. 2d at 1256 (Attorney General Richard Ieyoub); Simmons, 414 So. 2d at
705 (Attorney General William J. Guste); Louisiana v. Green, 390 So. 2d 1253 (La. 1980)
(Attorney General William J. Guste); King, 2014 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 409, at *1
(Attorney General James D. "Buddy" Caldwell).
183. LA. CONST. ANN. art. IV, § 8 (2005).
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responsibility for the quality of justice."'" Under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, " lawyers have a duty to challenge the
"rectitude of official action."' 6 A lawyer should seek improvement
of the law, as well as to the administration of justice, and should also
help the bar regulate itself in the public interest."'
Some defendants, lawyers, judges, historians 8 and reporters 89
have cried out for justice. Even the ABA has gone on record to say
that "unanimous verdict[s] should be required in all criminal cases.""so To date, these cries have not been heard. In our silence, we
have placed upon the poor and vulnerable the duty of addressing a
problem they did not create and are no way prepared to correct. What
is the explanation for the strong will to defend a practice or ignore a
Could state officials feel motivated by policy concerns
wrong?
suggesting that an open acknowledgement about the need for change
could open the floodgates of litigation?.9 ' Perhaps there is fear that
the countless citizens who have fallen victim to this system will call
upon the courts yet again. Perhaps there are fears of what the
families of those who died in custody as a result of this miscarriage of
justice will ask of this state. Perhaps there are reservations about the
financial implications of reducing the prison population in a state like
Louisiana, who is the forerunner when it comes to mass incarcera-

184.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., cmt. 1 (2015).

185.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2015).

186. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., cmt. 5.
187. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., cmt. 6.
188. See generally AIELLO, supra note 9.
189. James Gill, Jury Rules Aid Sloppy JudicialProcess in Louisiana, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE (Apr. 3, 2014), available at 2014 WLNR 10713701; see also Cohen, supra note
17.
190. See Weiss, supra note 175.
191. As troubling as this may seem, this is not an imagined thought. In a recent
Louisiana case where Albert Woodfox challenged his conviction on the grounds of racial
discrimination in the grand jury process, state officials actually made this plea of the court:
Perhaps more significantly, though, a ruling in Woodfox's favor would by definition
be based on a finding of systemic discrimination in West Feliciana between 198093. This would consequently call into question every criminal conviction based on
indictments issued during this period. The impact of the resulting flood of habeas
petitions on the State and the court system would be substantial, to say the least.
State's Post-Hearing memorandum at 39, Woodfox v. Cain, No. 3:06-cv-00789-JJB-DLD
(M.D. La. Nov. 2, 2012). The court declined the State's request to, in essence, engage in
a cover up. Woodfox v. Cain, 772 F.3d 358, 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2014). Instead, the court
relied on the law and rendered a ruling in Mr. Woodfox's favor as to the grand jury claim.
See id. at 383.
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tion.1 92
Perhaps there is uneasiness about being associated with
causes that champion the rights of convicts in a state where convicts
are often poor and African American. Might inaction be motivated by
fears of the reprisals that have come to those who champion causes
seen to be associated with civil rights or African Americans?
Perhaps, under the weight of selfish concerns, we failed to notice
that there are risks inherent in our lack. First, there are the harms
that flow from a public that has lost faith in the justice system:
[Tihe jurist concerned with public confidence in, and acceptance of
the judicial system might well consider that, however admirable its
resolute adherence to the law as it was, a decision contrary to the
public sense of justice as it is, operates, so far as it is known, to
diminish respect for the courts and for law itself.'93
Additionally, injustices like this further racial tensions. In Plessy v.
Ferguson,5 this reality was noted by Justice Harlan as he critiqued
his judicial colleagues in upholding Louisiana's separate railcar seating
law.' 9
In his dissent, Justice Harlan said, "State enactments ...
cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the [Civil War], under
the pretence of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result
than to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict
of races, the continuance of which must do harm to all concerned."'
Lastly, there is the risk of citizens practicing self-help and, in doing
so, creating what I term a fictitious "fourth branch of government."
The orchestrators of Louisiana's non-unanimous jury law were not
naive about this. At the same convention where they gave birth to this
law, it was said:
Whatever is unjust, carries in itself the seeds of defeat and decay.
Justice is irrepressible. No matter how you may trample it, no
matter with what fortifications you may surround the structure
which you build up in opposition to that great principle, its voice is
never silent. It clamors from day to day with a force that is
irresistible, until at last its voice will be heard and the structure,
whose foundations rest upon its violation, will crumble into ruin, a

192. See Jailersin Chief? CriminalJustice and Politics,THE ECONOMIST (July 15,2015)
("Louisiana's incarceration rate remain[s] steady at around 850 people per 100,000
residents-or over 1.1% of the state's adult population, the highest rate in the country.").
193. Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 293 n.4 (1972)).
194. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
195. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 560-61.
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corroboration of the maxim that; "Nothing is settled until it is settled

right."197

When one operates with an understanding of the narrative only, one
sees what appears to be race-neutral laws and an anticlimactic story.
When one deconstructs the narrative, the story expands and changes
form to something between a dramatic story and a horror story. To
achieve justice moving forward, members of the legal community must
do this with every story in law. And when revisions are needed, we
must revise. When character changes need to be made, we must
remove the old ones and add new ones. We must resist the will to
attain situational muteness and selective blindness so others will be
forced to address what it is that we are uniquely positioned to do. This
is a shared duty of the legal community and it is one that we have
been derelict in when it comes to this particular injustice. The pursuit
of justice is the reason we have been given power. Failure to use that
power or using that power abusively furthers injustices.
V.

CONCLUSION

Louisiana's non-unanimous jury laws were invented and implemented in an era where "the seizure and sale of a black man-even a black
child-was viewed as neither criminal nor extraordinary."'
The
passage of time may make memories distant, but it does not make
them nonexistent. A tainted system simply cannot be untainted by the
passage of time. Justice Harland insightfully penned these words in
his dissent to the Plessy v. Ferguson'99 case: "I am of opinion that
the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of

citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit
and letter of the Constitution of the United States."2 0 0 That was true
then and it remains true today (insofar as its non-unanimous jury
system in non-capital cases).
"For only a unanimous jury . .. can serve to minimize the potential
bigotry of those who might convict on inadequate evidence, or acquit
when evidence of guilt was clear."2 0'
According to the A.B.A.,
''unanimous verdicts are likely to be more accurate and reliable
because they require the most wide-ranging discussions-ones that

197.
198.
199.

LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 36.
BLACKMON, supra note 38, at 9.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).

200. Id. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
201. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 398 (Stewart, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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address and persuade every juror."202 The Blue Ribbon Commission
on Jury System improvement even opposes this practice.
This
commission "reached a virtual consensus that unanimity should
continue to be required for criminal cases in which the punishment is
death, life without a possibility of parole, or life with a possibility of
parole (the so-called 'life top' cases)."203
In this story about justice in the Deep South, justice is the victim.
Injustice is the villain. The narrative is the suspect-a person of
interest. The counternarrative is the hero. This is so because it
expands the plot and adds the rich cast of characters whose truths and
views would have been written out of the story were the narrative
allowed the center stage she often craves. When it comes to Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system in non-capital cases, I hope this is
the final chapter and not just the last word in the first book of a
forthcoming series.
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